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FEDERAL PUBLIC CORRUPTION STATUTES TARGETING STATE AND
LOCAL OFFICIALS: UNDERSTANDING THE CORE LEGAL ELEMENT
AND THE GOVERNMENT'S BURDEN OF PROVING
A CORRUPT INTENT AFTER MCDONNELL
THOMAS M. DIBIAGIo*
I. INTRODUCTION
State and local public officials who abuse their office to enrich themselves
and their friends directly affect the quality of life in their communities. This
conduct, left unchecked, puts into place a culture of corruption and impunity that
erodes public trust in government and deters legitimate investment and commerce
in the community. In response, there are three separate federal public corruption
statutes that target state and local corruption. The federal program integrity statute
targets a public official who demands or receives a payment "intending to be
influenced" in connection with federally funded programs.1 The federal extortion
statute addresses a public official who demands or receives a benefit "under color
of official right." 2 The federal mail and wire fraud statute makes it a federal crime
for a public official to deny the public "honest services."3 The recurring question
has been: what conduct falls within the scope of each of these statutes? Stated
another way, as practical matter, what do prosecutors need to prove and juries need
to find to sustain a public corruption conviction under these three federal criminal
laws?
The underlying conduct for each of these public corruption statutes is
essentially transactional. All three statutes require that the government prove a
connection between a benefit provided to a public official and an official act. It is
this agreement-nexus to state action or the conduct of government officials-that
is the criterion of guilt. The United States Supreme Court has made this point
clear: first by holding that extortion under color of title and honest services fraud
are limited to bribery and kickback schemes, and second, by holding in
McDonnell v. United States that the scope of an "official act" does not include
routine political activities and is limited to government action.5 However, one
additional step need be taken to give structure to the statutory scheme. Because the
* Partner, Baker Botts L.L.P. and former United States Attorney for the District of Maryland.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) (2012).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 195 1(b)(2) (2012).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012).
4. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 368 (2010) (honest services fraud); Evans v.
United States, 504 U.S. 255, 256 (1992) (extortion).
5. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2358 (2016).
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three public corruption statutes do not use the term "bribery" or "kickback," the
courts have often struggled to correctly define the critical element of the offense
and then to correctly translate this element into an evidentiary burden of proof.6
This failure presents a risk that the application of the law will be inconsistent and
therefore, fundamentally unfair.
The reasons for the struggle are numerous. First, courts have used the
term quid pro quo rather than "corrupt intent" to define the critical element of the
offense. Although these terms mean essentially the same thing-a link between the
benefit and official act-the courts have struggled to translate quid pro quo into a
clear evidentiary burden of proof As a consequence, the courts have characterized
the government's burden of proof in a variety of imprecise and vague ways and
have stated that prosecutors must prove "some connection between the benefit and
official act," "some understanding that the payment is linked to some official act,"
"some payment conditioned on the performance of some official act," ''something
short of a formalized and thoroughly articulated contractual agreement," "a corrupt
payment sufficiently linked to some official act," "some connection to an official
act when opportunities arise," or "some implied quidpro quo."
The courts should jettison these perception of the moment standards,
which are difficult to truly understand, clearly articulate the critical legal element
of these offenses, and bring clarity to the entire statutory scheme. First, courts
should recognize that all three offenses-the federal mail and wire fraud statutes,
the federal program integrity, and federal extortion statutes-are limited to bribery
and kickback schemes. Second, courts should hold that the critical legal element
for all three statutes requires the government to prove a corrupt intent-that the
benefit provided to the public official was intended to influence or affect state
action or the conduct of government officials. Third, to prove a corrupt intent, the
government should be required to identify state action or government conduct at or
near the time the benefit was provided to the public official. Taken together, this
approach would clarify the critical legal element of the offense by limiting the
scope of the statutes to bribery and kickback schemes as well as connect this legal
element to a more clearly defined requirement of the offense and evidentiary
burden of proof The result would be a statutory scheme that is both fundamentally
fair and captures the most pervasive and entrenched corruption schemes.
II. McDONNELL V. UNITED STATES
In McDonnell, the former governor of Virginia was charged with honest
services fraud and extortion.7 There was an unambiguous record of the conduct.
At trial, the government presented evidence that the defendant accepted $175,000
in loans, gifts, and other benefits in exchange for the defendant's influence in
6. See United States v. Tavares, 844 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2016) (reversing conviction and finding
that government failed to prove requisite link between job offers and official act).
7. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2355.
8. Id. at 2357.
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connection with an effort to have research studies undertaken at the Medical
College of Virginia and University of Virginia School of Medicine. The gifts
themselves were legal.10 However, the government introduced evidence that the
defendant accepted these benefits in exchange for at least five "official acts.""
Those acts included "arranging meetings" with Virginia State officials, "hosting"
events at the Governor's Mansion, and "contacting other government officials"
concerning the research studies.12
The defendant was convicted and he appealed.13 The defendant did not
deny that he received the "benefits" reflected by the evidence.14 Moreover, the
defendant did not challenge that there was some link between the loans and gifts
provided and the acts taken by him." He argued, however, that the acts in question
were not "official acts" prohibited by the honest services fraud and extortion
statute, but rather reflected routine political acts which were not prohibited by the
statutes. 16 The Supreme Court agreed and reversed his conviction.17 The Court held
that an "official act" under the statutes "must involve a formal exercise of
government power," and in this case, the jury was not instructed that the
government was required to prove, and that they were required to find, that the
conduct went beyond "simply expressing support for the research study" to
"pressuring or advising another government official on a pending matter."
The Supreme Court expressed concern about where the line should be
drawn between routine political acts and illegal behavior and held that an "official
act" under the federal bribery statute means "a formal exercise of government
power."19 The Court then explained that, "[a]lthough it may be difficult to define
the precise reach of those terms, it seems clear that a typical meeting, telephone
call, or event arranged by a public official does not qualify as a 'formal exercise of
government power.' "20 On the other hand, the Court found that "[u]sing your
official position to exert pressure on another public official to perform an 'official
act' would fall within the scope of the formal exercise of government power."21
The Court held that a conviction was dependent on a specific finding by the jury
9. Id. at 2357.
10. Id. at 2365.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 2358.
13. Id at 2367.
14. Id. at 2366.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2355.
18. Id. at 2358.
19. Id at 2371.
20. Id at 2358.
21. Id at 2359. See also United States v. Repak, _F.3d (3rd Cir. 2016) (affirming public
corruption conviction and finding that influencing and facilitating the award of economic
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that the defendant agreed to take formal and concrete government action in
exchange for the benefit provided:
It is up to the jury, under the facts of the case, to determine whether the
public official agreed to perform an "official act" at the time of the
alleged "quid pro quo." The jury may consider a broad range of
pertinent evidence, including the nature of the transaction, to answer
that question.
Simply expressing support for the research study at a meeting, event, or
call-or sending a subordinate to such a meeting, event, or call-similarly
does not qualify as a decision or action on the study, as long as the
public official does not intend to exert pressure on another official or
provide advice, knowing or intending such advice to form the basis for
an "official act." Otherwise, if every action somehow related to the
research study were an "official act," the requirement that the public
official make a decision or take an action on that study, or agree to do
so, would be meaningless.
Of course, this is not to say that setting up a meeting, hosting an event,
or making a phone call is always an innocent act, or is irrelevant, in
cases like this one. If an official sets up a meeting, hosts an event, or
makes a phone call on a question or matter that is or could be pending
before another official, that could serve as evidence of an agreement to
take an official act. A jury could conclude, for example, that the official
was attempting to pressure or advise another official on a pending
matter. And if the official agreed to exert that pressure or give the
advice in exchange for a thing of value, that would be illegal.22
The Supreme Court's decision in McDonnell provides some structure to the
application of the federal statutory scheme used to prosecute state and local
officials. However, the decision is also limited and does not resonate beyond the
particular conduct of the defendant in that case. On the other hand, there is a more
compelling theme being stated. The Court is clearly expressing a concern about the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion and the need for a fundamentally fair
application of the law-that it should be applied as a "scalpel" rather than a "meat
axe."23
Accordingly, there is one more step that needs to be taken. This article
sets forth a clear outline of the federal statutory scheme used to target corrupt state
and local officials and then argues for an additional step-that courts should now
require the prosecution to prove a direct connection between the benefit provided
to a public official and the official act.
22. Id. The government subsequently abandoned its prosecution of the defendant. See Alan
Blinder, U.S. Ends Corruption Case Against Former Governor of Virginia, N.Y. TIMES, September 9,
2016.
23. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2373.
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III. FEDERAL PUBLIC CORRUPTION STATUTES
A. INTRODUCTION
There are three primary federal statutes employed by federal prosecutors
against state and local corruption. First, the federal program integrity statute
addresses state and local programs that receive federal funds and makes it a crime
for a public official to demand or receive a payment "intending to be influenced."24
Second, the federal extortion statute makes it a federal crime for a public official to
use his position as a government official to extort money or property from a third
party.25 Third, the federal mail and wire fraud statute makes it a federal crime to
use the mails or interstate wires in connection with a scheme to defraud.2 6 Section
1346 defines a "scheme to defraud" to include defrauding the public of the
"intangible right to honest services."27 In Evans v. United States,28 the Supreme
Court limited the scope of the public corruption component of the federal extortion
statute to bribery and kickback schemes.2 9 In Skilling v. United States,3 0 the
Supreme Court narrowed the scope of honest services fraud to bribes and kickback
payments linked to official acts.3 1 Because the federal program integrity statute is
in pari materi with the honest services and extortion statutes-all are bribery
related offenses and share the identical core element-extending this limitation to
federal program bribery is obvious.
The commonality of each of these federal corruption statutes reaches
beyond the objective to hold public officials accountable for pervasive and
entrenched corrupt practices. Although the statutes do not use the terms "bribery"
or "kickback," all three statutes are essentially bribery and kickback offenses and
share a core legal element-that the government prove a sufficient nexus between
the benefit provided to a public official and state action or the conduct of
government officials. Therefore, to sustain a conviction the government must
prove, and the jury must find, a corrupt intent. To establish a corrupt intent, the
government must prove that the benefit was intended to influence state action or
24. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) (2012).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 195 1(b)(2) (2012).
26. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346 (2012).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012).
28. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 256 (1992).
29. Prosecutions for extortion under color of official right is essentially a bribery offense requiring
proof of a quidpro quo. Id. at 268.
30. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010). In Skilling, the government alleged that the
defendant, an executive of a private corporation, engaged in self-dealing but did not allege that he
solicited or accepted a bribe or kickback from a third party in exchange for making misrepresentations
to his company's shareholders about the company's fiscal health. The Supreme Court determined that
the defendant's honest services fraud conviction was flawed and reversed his conviction. Id. at 414-15.
See also United States v. Cantrell, 617 F.3d 919, 921 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming honest fraud conviction
after Skilling based on kickbacks to public official-steering public contracts to a third party in
exchange for a share of the proceeds).
31. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 409.
2017 51
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the conduct of a government official. To prove this connection, the prosecution
should be required to identify the state action or the conduct of government at or
near the time that the benefit is provided to the public official.
B. INTENT OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC CORRUPTION STATUTES
The federal public corruption statutory scheme is intended to serve the
public's interest by holding government officials accountable for pervasive and
entrenched corrupt practices. Beyond the erosion of trust in government, public
corruption undermines the quality of life in the community. State and local
corruption is typically characterized by "pay to play," 32 bribery,33 and kickback
schemeS3 4 conducted among a class of fixers who specialize in connecting public
officials with businessmen.3 5 Because state and local governments are primarily
32. The phrase "pay to play" typically references two practices that lead to corruption: (1)
companies use political donations and other financial benefits to public officials to bribe their way to
securing lucrative government contracts; and (2) public officials extorting financial benefits from
companies that wish to do business with the government. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, William
Rashbaum & Vivian Yee, Ex-Cuomo Aides Charged in Federal Corruption Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
23, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/23/nyregion/cuomo-former-aides-charges.html (federal
public corruption indictment alleging that state funded economic development contracts were awarded
in exchange for bribes to public officials); Campbell Robertson, Nagin Guilty of 20 Counts of Bribery
and Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/13/us/nagin-corruption-
verdict.html? r=0 (describing conviction of former Mayor of receiving vacations, cash and building
supplies in exchange for government contracts).
33. The term "bribe" means a payment in return for a vote, appointment, or other public act by a
lawmaker or government official. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, Ex-councilwoman and Admirer Found
Guilty in Yonkers Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/30/nyregion/two-convicted-in-yonkers-corruption-case.html. In this
case, prosecutors introduced evidence that the defendant, a former City council member, accepted
$195,000 in payment (including a down payment on her residences, payments for her student loans and
a Mercedes) from a political operative in exchange for votes to approve a proposed luxury mall and
housing complex. The jury rejected the defense argument that the benefits reflected gifts and a romantic
relationship. See also Benjamin Weiser, Lobbyist is Expected to Enter Guilty Plea in Corruption Case,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/04/nyregion/guilty-plea-by-richard-
lipsky-lobbyist-is-expected-in-bribery-case.html (describing scheme where lobbyist paid New York
State Senator cash in exchange for Senator's public action including sponsoring and supporting
legislation, lobbying other elected officials, and directing state funds for the benefit of lobbyist).
34. In the public corruption context, the term "kickback" means a payment in return for a
government contract. See William K. Rashbaum, City Official Accused of Taking Bribes, Left in Boxes
and Cups, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/07/nyregion/nyc-housing-
official-is-among-7-charged-with-bribery.html (describing charges against commissioner at the New
York Department of Housing Preservation and Development based on allegations that the defendant
took $600,000 in bribes and kickbacks from developers in exchange for steering city contracts to the
developers and that the cost of the kickbacks were passed on to the city through inflated invoices); See
Cantrell, 617 F.3d at 921 (affirming conviction based on defendant's use of his office to secure
contracts for company in exchange for share of proceeds).
35. See William K. Rashbaum, Albany Trials Exposed the Power of a Real Estate Firm, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/19/nyregion/real-estate-firms-power-is-laid-
bare-in-fall-of-albany-leaders.html ("The recent federal trials that ended in the quick convictions of
Sheldon Silver and Dean G. Skelos laid bare a world of greed, flagrant corruption and abuse of power
6
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responsible for providing critical public services such as education, public safety,
healthcare, public assistance for the poor, and building roads, bridges, schools, and
libraries, corruption at this level has a corrosive and distorting impact on the
quality of life in the community.3 6 In particular, pervasively corrupting influences
intended to manipulate and orchestrate the awarding of public contracts and
services in return for bribes or kickbacks divert limited government resources
away from needed community services.3 7 In addition to diverting public money,
corrupt practices that manipulate government contracts and municipal services
further undermine economic growth by putting in place a culture of corruption that
deters legitimate investment and commerce. The added cost of doing business in a
in Albany, with evidence showing payoffs taking a deceptive circular route from business interests to
the elected officials whose help they sought."). As a practical consequence, the enforcement of these
federal corruption statutes typically targets powerful public officials and money interests. The
enforcement of these laws, therefore, serves to further public confidence in the justice system by
sending a compelling message to the community that the laws apply to everyone. See Joe Nocera, How
to Prevent Oil Spills, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/14/opinion/nocera-
how-to-prevent-oil-spills.html ("I have argued in the past, mainly in the context of the financial crisis,
that the country has been poorly served by the Justice Department's unwillingness to hold to account
big shots like Angelo Mozillo, the former chief executive of Countrywide, whose companies' illegal
practices helped lead us to the brink of financial apocalypse. It has sent a terrible message that there are
two kinds of justice; one for the rich and powerful; and another for everybody else."); see also Joe
Nocera, Biggest Fish Face Little Risk of Being Caught, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/26/business/economy/26nocera.html.
36. See Richard Perez-Pena, 13 Detroit School Principals Charged in Vendor Kickback
Scheme, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/us/13-detroit-school-
principals-charged-in-vendor-kickback-scheme.html ("In Detroit's crumbling schools, where the threat
of insolvency means that basic repairs, supplies and even teachers are in short supply, 13 principals
conspired with a vendor to defraud the system, siphoning away millions of dollars ... The
principals ... ordered supplies like paper, workbooks and chairs from the vendor, the Detroit Public
Schools paid the bills. The vendor then delivered only some of the supplies to the schools and paid
$908,518 in kickbacks to the principals. . . ."); Benjamin Weiser & Marc Santora, In 2nd Alleged Bribe
Scheme, a Legislator was in on the Case, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/05/nyregion/assemblyman-eric-stevenson-is-accused-of-taking-
bribes.html?pagewanted=all (describing corruption charges against New York State assemblymen
based on cash payments in exchange for assistance in opening adult day care centers and introducing
legislation to block competing operators from opening centers); Mary M. Chapman, Former Mayor of
Detroit Guilty in Corruption Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2013), a
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/12/us/kwame-kilpatrick-ex-mayor-of-detroit-convicted-in-corruption-
case.html (describing conviction of former Mayor of public corruption charges based on an pervasive
practice of shakedowns, kickbacks, and bid-rigging schemes); Monica Davey & Mary Williams Walsh,
Billions in Debt, Detroit Tumbles into Insolvency, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/us/detroit-files-for-bankruptcy.html?pagewanted=all (describing
Detroit's filing for bankruptcy); Mary Williams Walsh, In Alabama, a County that Fell Off the
Financial Cliff, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/business/jefferson-
county-ala-falls-off-the-bankruptcy-cliff.html (describing largest Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy
resulting from sewer project and corrupt financial schemes). In addition to the corruption involving
government contacts, municipal debt financing and bond issuances has also been corrupted by the self-
dealing by public officials.
37. A substantial portion of these public projects, although administered by state and local
officials, are funded by federal programs and grants.
7
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culture of corruption deters individuals from starting new businesses and deters
existing businesses from growing.38 However, the clear harm to the community
does not outweigh the need to ensure a fundamentally fair application of the law.
C. 18 USC § 1346 MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD
The federal mail and wire fraud statutes make it a crime to use the mails
or interstate wires in connection with a scheme to defraud. Section 1346 defines a
"scheme to defraud" to include defrauding the public of the "intangible right of
honest services."39 The meaning of the form "intangible right of honest services"
has been clearly defined by the Supreme Court to be limited to a bribery or
kickback scheme.40 Therefore, after Skilling, to sustain an honest services fraud
conviction, the government must prove that: (1) the defendant demanded or
accepted a bribe or kickback; and (2) used the mails or wires in furtherance of the
criminal activity.41
The Fourth Circuit's decision in McDonnell provides relevant guidance
on the standard of proof to establish corrupt intent. The McDonnell court held that
to prove a corrupt intent, the prosecution must demonstrate more than an
38. See Matthew Dolan, Detroit Arena's Revival Points a Way for City, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 23,
2012, 10:32 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304331204577352101951231234.
Describing the challenges in reviving the Cobo convention center after years of widespread corruption,
Dolan explained:
To be sure, the convention center's financial challenges pale next to the fiscal
crisis gripping Detroit. Under the weight of a $265 million deficit and no infusion
of cash from Michigan on the horizon, it will be a tough road to recovery for a
city that lost one-quarter of its population between 2000 and 2010.
... Cobo ... was long a troubled asset for Detroit. Less than one-third of its
700,000 square feet of exhibit space was used for many years. It tied for last
place in hosting national conventions and trade shows among similarly sized
centers, according to a 2010 report from Conventions, Sports & Leisure, a
consulting firm.
A big drawback [to attracting conventions]: widespread corruption that inflated
exhibitors' costs. Two successive Cobo directors were sent to federal prison in
2009 for taking bribes from a contractor who provided electrical, janitorial,
catering and retail services. Patrons and exhibitors also complained of Cobo's
poor food, parking hassles and inefficient loading docks.
Id.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012).
40. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 368.
41. Id. at 412-13; See United States v. George, 676 F.3d 249, 252 (1st Cir. 2012) (explaining that
the Supreme Court "truncated the reach" of the honest services fraud in Skilling by limiting it to bribery
and kickback schemes); United States v. Barraza, 655 F.3d 375, 382 (5th Cir. 2011) (stating that
"honest services fraud only consists of bribery and kickbacks, not the failure to disclose receipt of
money"); United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 243-44 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating that Skilling "defined
the 'core' of honest services fraud" to include only bribery and kickback schemes); Ryan v. United
States, 645 F.3d 913, 914 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2009 (2012), remanded 688 F.3d 845 (7th
Cir. 2012) (explaining that Skilling held that the honest services form of the mail-fraud offense "covers
only bribery and kickback schemes").
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expectation.4 2 On appeal, the McDonnell defendant claimed that the district court's
jury instruction failed to require the government to sufficiently prove that the
benefits were sufficiently linked to a specific official act.3
The appellate court agreed with the defendant's contention that a higher
standard of proof applied, but rejected his argument that the district court failed to
properly instruct the jury on the law." The court clearly affirmed the higher burden
of proof and confirmed that the government was required to prove that the benefits
were linked to a specific act.4 5 The court first acknowledged that both honest
services fraud and extortion are essentially bribery offenses requiring the
government to prove a quid pro quo.46 The court then defined the term quid pro
quo to require the government to prove a corrupt intent-intent on the part of the
defendant to influence a specific official act.47 The court found that proving that a
benefit was provided to a public official to generate good will is not enough.48 The
court then explained that bribery occurs only if the benefit is "coupled with a
particular criminal intent" and this intent must be more than "a vague hope or
expectation" that the public official will "reward the generosity."4 9 The court then
held that the government must show that the defendant intended to secure or
influence a "specific official action."o5
The Court of Appeals in McDonnell concluded that the district court
clearly articulated this standard to the jury and that the evidence was sufficient to
establish a "corrupt understanding."5 The defendant had received money, loans,
favors, and gifts, and those benefits were linked to efforts to obtain research at a
state university, state grant funds, and coverage for the dietary supplement under
the state employee health care.5 2 The "temporal relationship" between the benefits
provided to the defendant and the official acts represented "compelling evidence of
corrupt intent": none of these gifts were goodwill gifts from one friend to another.
Indeed, the defendant had no relationship with the company until after he was
elected Governor.53
However, courts have generally not articulated such a clear evidentiary
standard and have imposed a lower standard of proof on the government. The
courts have accepted the ambiguity and have not required the government to
identify the temporal connection between the state action and the benefit provided,
42. United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 487-92 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. granted in part, 1365
S. Ct. 89 (2016), and vacated and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
43. Id at 505.
44. Id at 514.
45. Id
46. Id at 506.
47. Id. at 514.
48. Id. at 515.
49. Id
50. Id
51. Id. at 514.
52. Id. at 518-19.
53. Id at 519-20.
2017 55
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and have held that to sustain an honest services conviction the government meets
its burden of proof by demonstrating only that the benefits were provided to the
public official to influence some official act.54 For example, in United States v.
Bryant, the defendants, a New Jersey State Senator and the Dean of the School of
Osteopathic Medicine, were charged with honest services fraud and federal
program bribery.5 At trial, the government presented evidence that the senator
received a "low-show" job at the medical school as a "Program Support
Coordinator" in exchange for his efforts as the chairman of the Senate
Appropriations Committee to funnel state funding to the school.56 The government
asserted that as a result of this corrupt relationship, an additional $10 million in
funding was provided to the medical school over a three-year period.57 The
defendants were convicted and appealed.8 On appeal, the defendants argued that
the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions and that the district court's
jury instruction on both charges was defective.59
The Third Circuit first ruled that the evidence was sufficient to prove a
link between the employment at the medical school and the state funding.60 The
court found that the evidence indicated that the defendants had an understanding,
even if implicit, that his salary, bonus, and pension eligibility from his position at
the medical school was given in exchange for efforts to increase state funding for
the school.61 The court primarily relied on the timing of the efforts to increase
funding over the course of his nearly three-year employment to establish the link.62
The defendants complained that the jury instructions for the honest
services fraud counts were flawed in light of Skilling.63 Specifically, the defendants
asserted that the district court's jury instruction did not make clear that the jury
was required to find that the benefits were intended to "alter" the actions of the
public official.64 The appellate court rejected the defendants' "alter" theory and
found that the trial court's instructions correctly set forth the government's burden
of proof.65 The court explained that to prove a quid pro quo in support of honest
services fraud, the government is not required to present evidence that attributes
each corrupt payment to each official action by the public official.66 Rather, the
court found that it was enough for the government to present evidence that there
54. See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 236-37 (3d Cir. 2011).
55. Id at 236-37. For other examples from the Third Circuit, see United States v. Wright, 665
F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 2012) and United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2007).
56. Id at 237.
57. Id
58. Id
59. Id at 240.
60. Id
61. Id at 241.
62. Id
63. Id at 243.
64. Id at 244.
65. Id at 245.
66. Id at 241.
56 VOL. 7
10
University of Denver Criminal Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol7/iss1/3
FEDERAL PUBLIC CORRUPTION STATUTES
was "an intent to influence" sufficient to establish the link between the payments
and some official action.67
In United States v. Rosen, the defendants, the chief executive of a network
of hospitals and three New York State legislators, were charged with honest
services fraud.68 At trial, federal prosecutors introduced evidence that showed that
the chief executive provided the legislators with consulting fees in exchange for
state financial assistance for the hospitals.69 The defendants argued that the
payments were legitimate consulting fees and were not directly connected to any
specific official act.70 However, the government pointed out that a close
examination of the evidence revealed that little or no consulting work was
performed under the contracts.7 1 Thus, the defendants were convicted and
subsequently appealed.72
On appeal, the defendants argued that the evidence was insufficient to
prove the existence of the required quid pro quo to sustain the charges.73 The
Second Circuit rejected the defendants' assertion. The court first ruled that the
illegality of an "as opportunities arise" or series of corrupt payments was a valid
prosecution theory.74 Therefore, the court held that in cases involving public
officials, a trier of fact may "infer guilt from evidence of benefits received and
subsequent favorable treatment, as well as from behavior indicating consciousness
of guilt." 7 5 The court was not persuaded that any direct link was required to sustain
a conviction, stating, "evidence of a corrupt agreement in bribery cases is usually
circumstantial, because bribes are seldom accompanied by written contracts,
receipts or public declarations of clear admissions and expressions of intentions in
,,76documents or conversations. Rejecting the assertion that the payments were
gratuities rather than bribes, the court found that the amounts involved exceeded
what reasonably could be expected for a gratuity.77 Additionally, the court
concluded that any collateral benefit to the public from the bribery scheme was
irrelevant and held that "an illegal quid pro quo exchange persists even though the
state legislator's acts also benefit constituents other than the defendant."78
In United States v. McDonough, the First Circuit held that a lower
standard of proof applied and that the government was not required to prove that
67. Id at 241.
68. United States v. Rosen, 716 F.3d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 2013). For other examples from the Second
Circuit, see United States v. Bruno, 661 F. 3d 733 (2d Cir. 2011) and United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d
134 (2d Cir. 2007).
69. Id at 702.
70. Id
71. Id at 702-03.
72. Id at 698-99.
73. Id
74. Id. at 700.
75. Id. at 702-03.
76. Id.
77. Id at 702-04.
78. Id at 701-02.
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the defendant intended to influence a specific state action, but rather only that the
defendant desired to induce some official act.79 In this case, the defendants, the
former Speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives and a lobbyist,
were convicted of honest services fraud and extortion.0 At trial, the government
introduced evidence that the defendants were provided cash payments in exchange
for influencing the award of and ensuring funding for two state software
contracts.81
On appeal, the appellate court held that the evidence was sufficient to
prove that the defendants received a series of payments that were sufficiently
connected to official acts to sustain both the honest services and extortion
convictions.82 The court explained that:
[T]he government must prove ... the receipt of something of value "in
exchange for" an official act. Such an agreement need not be tied to a
specific act by the recipient. "It is sufficient if the public official
understood that he or she was expected to exercise some influence on
the payor's behalf as opportunities arose." Ultimately, [w]hat is needed
is an agreement . . . which can be formal or informal, written or oral ...
We start by noting that "evidence of a corrupt agreement in bribery
cases is usually circumstantial, because bribes are seldom accompanied
by written contracts, receipts or public declarations of intentions."83
In United States v. Whitfield, the defendants, a trial attorney and two state court
judges, were charged with various public corruption offenses based on loan
guarantees that were provided in exchange for favorable decisions on cases
pending before the judges.84 At trial, the government introduced evidence that the
judges accepted these loan guarantees but never intended to pay them back." The
government also presented evidence that called into question the legitimacy of the
86loans based on the timing of the financial transactions. More specifically, the
defendant attorney had a significant contingency fee case pending before each of
the defendant judges.87 The defendants were convicted and they appealed.
The Fifth Circuit rejected the defendants' claim that the government was
required to prove a direct link between the payment and specific official acts
identified at the time loans were arranged or guaranteed. Rather, the court held
79. United States v. McDonough, 727 F.3d 143, 153 (1st Cir. 2013). For another example from
the First Circuit, see United States v. Urchiuoli 613 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2010).
80. Id at 148-52.
81. Id. at 153.
82. Id at 156.
83. Id. at 152-53 (citations omitted).
84. United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325, 335 (5th Cir. 2009).
85. Id. at 336.
86. Id at 337.
87. Id
88. Id. at 351-53.
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that the government was only required to prove that the payment was demanded or
accepted for some official act.89 The court explained that as a practical matter, "it
would have been impossible" for the defendants to have agreed on what cases the
judges would fix at the time the loans were arranged because one of the cases at
issue had not been filed in one judge's court and the other judge was only then
running for election and "was not yet on the bench."90 The district court's jury
instructions explained that:
In order to prove the scheme to defraud another of honest services
through bribery, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the particular defendant entered into a corrupt agreement to provide
the particular judge with things of value specifically with the intent to
influence the action or judgment of the judge on any question, matter,
cause or proceeding which may be then or thereafter pending subject to
the judge's action or judgment.91
The defendants also complained that because the loan guarantees were made in the
context of the defendant's electoral campaigns, their constitutional right to free
political speech was at stake in this case.9 2 As a consequence, the defendants
argued that the McCormick93 standard applied and required the government to
prove that there was an explicit quid pro quo involving a specific official act
identified at the time that the defendant arranged and guaranteed the loans from the
bank.94 The defendants claimed that, by failing to sufficiently require a quid pro
quo exchange, the district court allowed the jury to convict them for acts that
essentially amounted to gratuity, not bribery.9 5
The court acknowledged that the government was required to prove that
the payment was sufficiently linked to an official act.96 However, the court held
that the district court accurately set for this the legal element and burden of proof:
For the sake of argument, we will assume that McCormick [does] apply
and that a quid pro quo instruction was required in this case. In doing
so, we are also willing to assume that the initial $40,000 loan guarantee
to [defendant] and the $25,000 loan guarantee to [defendant] were
campaign contributions. However, we reject any attempt to characterize
the $100,000 loan guarantee to [the defendant] for the down-payment on
89. Id. at 353.
90. Id. at 353 n.17.
91. Id. at 348.
92. Id at 348.
93. In McCormick v. United States, the Court held that when the benefit takes the form of a
campaign contribution, the government must prove a direct connection between the payment and a
specific official act. 500 U.S. 257, 273 (1991).
94. 590 F.3d at 348-49.
95. Id at 349.
96. Id at 352-53.
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a home and the financial and legal assistance provided to [defendant] in
connection with his state prosecution for embezzlement as having
anything to do with their respective electoral campaigns. Still, even if
we assume that a quid pro quo instruction was necessary because at
least some of the financial transactions in question were campaign-
related, we conclude that the jury charge in this case sufficiently
fulfilled that requirement.
Despite the district court's failure to include the actual phrase quid pro
quo in the jury charge, in the instant context the instructions sufficiently
conveyed the "essential idea of give-and-take." Under the undisputed
facts here, the jury's finding that there was a corrupt agreement
necessarily entailed a finding of an exchange of things of value for
favorable rulings in the judges' courts. Therefore, to the extent that a
quid pro quo instruction may have been required in this case, the district
court adequately delivered one.97
In Ryan v. United States, the former Governor of Illinois moved to vacate, set
aside, or correct his sentence for honest services fraud.98 At his initial trial, the
government introduced evidence that the defendant accepted kickbacks in the form
of financial benefits in exchange for steering state contracts.99 The court denied the
defendant's motion to vacate his conviction and found that the jury instructions
and evidence supported a corrupt payment theory-that the defendant was
provided financial benefits in exchange for an official act.100
The court explained that the "stream of benefits theory" allows for a
bribery or kickback conviction based on evidence that benefits were provided to
the public official during the same period of time that the public official exercised
influence and favorable treatment.101 The court explained that:
[The defendant] is correct that, post- Skilling, an honest services fraud
conviction does require a bribery or kickback scheme. As the court
reads the challenged instruction, however, nothing in it suggests such a
scheme is not a required path to conviction. In fact, this instruction
taken alone suggests that a bribe is required for conviction. The
instruction requires that "the government prove[ ] beyond a reasonable
doubt that the public official accepted the personal and financial benefits
with the understanding that the public official would perform or not
97. Id. at 353.
98. Ryan v. United States, 759 F. Supp. 2d 975, 977-78 (N.D. Ill. 2010), affd, 645 F.3d 913 (7th
Cir. 2011), vacated on other grounds, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012), remanded, 688 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012).
99. See United States v. Warner, No. 02 CR 506-1, 2006 WL 2583722 at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7,
2006).
100. Ryan, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 987-88.
101. Id. at 984-85.
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perform acts in his official capacity in return-an instruction
indistinguishable from a bribery instruction.102
The law does not require that the government identify a specific official
act given in exchange for personal and financial benefits received by the
public official so long as the government proves beyond a reasonable
doubt that the public official accepted the personal and financial benefits
with the understanding that the public official would perform or not
perform acts in his official capacity in return.
Likewise, the law does not require that the government identify a
specific official act given in exchange for personal and financial benefits
received by the public official so long as the government proves beyond
a reasonable doubt that the personal and financial benefits were given
with the understanding that the public official would perform or not
perform acts in his official capacity in return.10 3
The court then addressed the defendant's challenge to the campaign contribution
instruction. The defendant asserted that the government was required to prove a
direct link between the campaign contribution and a specific official act.104 The
district court found that the McCormick standard applied to honest services
prosecutions and agreed that the government was required to prove a direct link
between a benefit and official act.10 However, the court found that the jury was
given the required instruction: "a campaign contribution can be deemed a bribe
only if the money is given in return for a commitment to take (or not take) a
specific action." 10 6
In United States v. DiMasi, the Speaker of Massachusetts House of
Representatives, was convicted of honest services fraud and extortion.107 At trial,
the government introduced detailed evidence that the defendant received kickbacks
in exchange for steering and funding state contracts for computer software.10 The
government relied on this evidence to support both charges.109 In a post-trial
motion, the defendant asserted that the evidence was not sufficient to support the
convictions and that the district court's jury instructions on honest services and
extortion were not correct statements of the law.1 10 The defendant asserted that the
government was required to prove a direct link between the benefits and a specific
official act."
102. Id. at 986 (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 987-88 (quoting district court's jury instructions).
104. Id at 986-87.
105. Id at 989.
106. Id
107. United States v. DiMasi, 810 F. Supp. 2d 347, 349, 360 (D. Mass. 2011).
108. Id. at 357-58.
109. Id at 360.
110. Id. at 350.
111. Id. at 354 n.4.
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The district court denied the defendant's motion.112 The court first
recognized that honest services fraud and extortion share a core legal element and
that to sustain the honest services and extortion convictions, the government was
required to prove a link between the payment and an official act.113 The court then
found that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions.1 14
The court determined that the evidence showed that: (1) the firm seeking state
contracts made monthly retainer payments to the defendant's law practice; (2)
there were discussions with the defendant about potential contracts; (3) the
defendant was given talking points in support of the contracts; (4) the defendant
actually used one of those points in an effort to influence a state agency to award
contracts; (5) the defendant worked consistently and successfully to provide
funding; and (6) the state contracts were actually awarded to the firm that provided
the benefits.115
The court rejected the defendant's assertion that the government was
required to prove that the payment was directly linked to an identifiable official
act.1 16 The court also found that the government could rely on circumstantial
evidence to prove the link: "an unlawful agreement . . . need not be express, [and]
can be proven by inference, based on circumstantial evidence."1 17
In United States v. Mosberg, a real estate developer was charged with
honest services fraud in connection with his relationship with the attorney for the
local town planning board.1 The government argued that the defendant engaged
in several real estate deals with the attorney's family members in exchange for
influence and favorable treatment in connection with numerous pending real estate
development projects.119 Specifically, the indictment alleged that the defendant
"'g[a]ve the Attorney ... a stream of concealed bribes ... often in the form of
favorable real estate transactions, in exchange for the Attorney exercising ...
"official authority" ' to assist the defendant.120
Prior to trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment complaining
that it failed' to allege a quid pro quo bribery scheme consistent with Skilling and
112. Id. at 362, 366.
113. Id. at 353-56.
114. Id. at 361.
115. Id. at 358-60.
116. Id. at 354.
117. Id. at 355. The district court's instructions required proof that payments were made with the
intent to influence an official act:
The jury was also instructed that it was not necessary for the government to
prove that the scheme involved making a specific payment for a specific official
act; rather, it would be sufficient if the government proved beyond a reasonable
doubt a scheme to make a series of payments in exchange for [the defendant]
performing official actions benefitting [others] as opportunities arose.
Id at 356.
118. United States v. Mosberg, 866 F. Supp. 2d 275, 280-82 (D.N.J. 2011).
119. Id
120. Id at 288 (quoting the government indictment).
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with pre-Skilling case law.12 1 In particular, the defendant argued that the indictment
was required to allege a direct link between the real estate deals and specific
official acts.12 2 The district court disagreed and denied the defendant's motion.12 3
The court held that the indictment sufficiently alleged a nexus between the
payment and some official acts: "[t]he Indictment alleges the elements of honest
services fraud, and apprises [the defendant] of the sort of bribery scheme that he
must defend against-favorable real estate deals in exchange for expediting or
favorably resolving Planning Board matters and Township litigation." 1 2 4 The court
also acknowledged that this legal element was common to both program bribery
and honest services charges.1 25
D. 18 USC § 1951 EXTORTION
Section 1951, the federal extortion statute, or the Hobbs Act, makes it a
crime for a person to commit extortion either (1) through threatened force,
violence or fear; or (2) "under color of official right." 1 2 6 To convict a defendant of
extortion under a color of official right, courts have typically identified the
elements as follows: (1) the defendant must be a public official; (2) who solicited
or accepted a payment ("money or property"); (3) the payment must have been
induced "under color of official right"; and (4) there must have been at least a de
minimis effect on commerce.1 2 7 The text of the statute does not use the term
"bribe" or "kickback." However, in Evans v. United States, the Supreme Court
limited extortion under color or official right to bribery and kickback schemes.128
121. Id
122. Id at 283-84.
123. Id. at 315.
124. Id
125. Id. at 304. The district court held that a corrupt payment can exist even if the public official
takes official action that he always intended:
[A]n allegation that a [public official] "exchanged" official actions for a bribe
necessarily means that the bribe had some influence on that discretion-even if,
as things tumed out, the official's actions were the same as they would have been
absent the bribe. This is because the "exchange" removes discretion from the
legislator-which he is obligated to exercise in the best interests of the public-
and instead locks him into a position favoring one constituent, as dictated by the
quidpro quo arrangement.
Id. at 295 (internal citation omitted).
126. 18 U.S.C. § 195 1(b)(2) (2012).
127. 18 U.S.C. § 1951. See Sekhar v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2720 (2013) (reversing Hobbs Act
conviction and holding that internal recommendations of an attorney are not transferable and therefore
not property under Section 1951); United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 936 (9th Cir.
2009); Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 267 (1992) (defining "money or property" under § 1951 to
include any property that is transferable).
128. 504 U.S. at 258, 260, 268 (1992). See also United States v. Blagojevich, 794 F.3d 729 (7th
Cir. 2015) (recognizing that to sustain conviction under extortion statute government must prove a quid
pro quo-that a public official performed an official act in exchange for a private benefit but reversing
conviction and holding that scope of quid pro quo does not include the exchange of an official act for
another official act).
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Therefore, prosecutions for extortion under color of official right, similar to
prosecutions under other bribery related statutes, require the government to prove a
corrupt intent-intent to influence state action or the conduct of government.
The courts, however, have been reluctant to impose this burden of proof
in extortion cases and have sustained convictions under lower standards
of proof. For example, in United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, the Ninth
Circuit held that to sustain an extortion conviction "under color of
official right," where the payment is not a campaign contribution, the
government is required to prove a direct link between a benefit and
official act.129 In Kincaid, a member of the Clark County
Commissioners was charged with extortion.130 At trial, the government
introduced evidence that the defendant received cash payments in
exchange for influence and favorable treatment in connection with
ordinances, permits, and licenses affecting the operation of adult clubs
in Las Vegas.131 The district court instructed the jury that in order for
the defendant to be found guilty of extortion "under official right," the
government must prove that: (1) the defendant was a public official; (2)
the defendant obtained money or property; (3) the defendant knew that
the money was given in return for taking some official action; and (4)
there was an impact on interstate commerce.132
On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court erred by failing to instruct
the jury that to sustain the conviction the government was required to prove and
the jury was required to find a quid pro quo-a direct link between the payment
and a specific official act.13 3 The Ninth Circuit disagreed and affirmed the
conviction.134 The court viewed extortion and bribery in pari materia and held that
each requires a connection between the benefit provided to the public official and
an official act.1 35 However, the court held that a lower standard of proof applied to
sustain an extortion conviction and reasoned that where the payment is not a
campaign contribution, the government was required to prove only a sufficient link
between the payment and some official act, rather than a direct link between the
payment and a specific official act.1 36 The court's statements as to what was
sufficient to sustain a conviction were less than convincing. The court explained
that there must be "some understanding that the payment were in exchange for
'some' official act" and that the government was not required to identify the
129. 556 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2009), abrogatedby Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010).
130. Id at 926.
131. Id at 926-28.
132. Id at 937.
133. Id. at 936.
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official act at or near the time that the benefit was provided to the public official.1 3 7
The court then concluded that the jury instruction adequately stated the
government's burden of proof
In the case of a public official who obtains money, other than a
campaign contribution, the Government does not have to prove an
explicit promise to perform a particular act made at the time of the
payment. Rather, it is sufficient if the public official understands that he
or she is expected as a result of the payment to exercise particular kinds
of influence as specific opportunities arise.
Although "[n]o specific instruction to find an express quid pro quo was
given," this instruction adequately stated the implicit quid pro quo
element ... The instruction tells the jury that it can only find a
defendant guilty if it finds that she "knew that the money was given in
return for taking some official action." It then elaborates that the
government does not have to show an express promise, but the public
official must understand that "she is expected as a result of the payment
to exercise particular kinds of influence as specific opportunities arise."
"[A]1though the magic words quid pro quo were not uttered, a
simplified version of the concept, the idea that 'you get something and
you give something,' was."138
Likewise, the Third Circuit has held that Section 1951 does not require the
prosecution to prove a corrupt intent and that the government was only required to
prove an implied understanding.1 3 9 In United States v. Antico, the defendant, who
held various positions at the Department of Licenses and Inspections for the City
of Philadelphia, was charged with extortion. 14 At trial, the government introduced
evidence that the defendant was provided financial benefits in exchange for
approving zoning, use permits, and licenses for several businesses.14 1 The
defendant was convicted and he appealed.142 On appeal, the defendant argued that
the district court failed to instruct the jury that the government was required to
prove a specific quid pro quo.143 The Third Circuit rejected the defendant's
argument and held that the extortion statute contains no express quid pro quo
requirement in the non-campaign contribution context.144 The appellate court did
137. Id.
138. Id. at 937-38 (citations omitted).
139. United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 2001), abrogated by Skilling v. United States,
561 U.S. 358 (2010).
140. Id.
141. 275 F.3d at 248-49.
142. Id. at 245.
143. Id. at 255.
144. Id at 257; see also United States v. Salahuddin, 765 F.3d 329, 343 (3rd Cir. 2014) (to sustain
a Hobbs Act conviction based on soliciting charitable contributions the government is not required to
prove an explicit quid pro quo).
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hold, however, that the phrase "under color of official right" requires the
government to prove that the defendant accepted benefits with the implied
understanding that he would perform or not perform an official act.1 4 5 The court
explained that: "The quid pro quo can be implicit, that is, a conviction can occur if
the Government shows that [the defendant] accepted payments or other
consideration with the implied understanding that he would perform or not perform
an act in his official capacity "under color of official right." 146
The Sixth Circuit has held that Section 666's "intending to be influenced"
and Section 1951's "under color of official right" mean the same thing-that the
government is required to prove a connection between the benefit and some
official act.1 47 In United States v. Abbey, a City Administrator for Burton,
Michigan was charged with both Section 666 and Section 1951 violations.1 48 At
trial, the government presented evidence that the defendant was given real estate in
exchange for favorable treatment in connection with a decision that would affect a
proposed real estate development.1 49 The same evidence was used for both charges
and the government did not introduce any evidence establishing that when the
property was transferred to the defendant, there was an agreement o take a specific
official act.15 o On appeal, the defendant argued that to sustain each of his
convictions, the government was required to prove that the benefit was linked to a
specific official act.15 1
The Sixth Circuit rejected the defendant's contention and held that the
statutes do not contain such a heightened standard of proof that requires the
prosecution to prove a corrupt intent.1 5 2 The court held that this "quid pro quo
requirement" was limited to when the benefit takes the form of a campaign
contribution.1 53 The court then acknowledged that a lesser "quid pro quo
requirement applies to all" Section 666 and Section 1951 prosecutions.15 4 The
court tried to distinguish, in a less than clear way, the two standards of proof 155
145. Id. at 258. In United States v. Munchak, 527 F. App'x 191 (3d Cir. 2013), the defendants,
County Commissioners in Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania, were charged with Hobbs Act extortion.
At trial, the government introduced evidence that the defendants demanded payments in exchange for
government contracts. The defendants were convicted and they appealed. On appeal, the defendants
argued that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that it could convict them of extortion and
federal program bribery absent an explicit quid pro quo. The Third Circuit rejected this assertion and
affirmed the conviction.
146. 275 F.3d at 258.





152. Id. at 518.
153. Id. at 517-18.
154. Id. at 517 (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 519.
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However, it is doubtful that this effort added to the understanding of the
government's burden of proof
[N]ot all quid pro quos are made of the same stuff. The showing
necessary may still vary based on context, though all cases require the
existence of some kind of agreement between briber and official ...
"Indeed, in circumstances like this one-outside the campaign context-
[r]ather than requir[e] an explicit quid-pro-quo promise, the elements of
extortion are satisfied by something short of a formalized and
thoroughly articulated contractual arrangement (i.e., merely knowing
that the payment was made in return for official acts is enough)." A
public official thus commits extortion 'under color of official right
whenever he knowingly receives a bribe.
So [the defendant] is wrong in contending that, to sustain a Hobbs Act
conviction, the benefits received must have some explicit, direct link
with a promise to perform a particular, identifiable act when the illegal
gift is given to the official. Instead, it is sufficient if the public official
understood that he or she was expected to exercise some influence on
the payor's behalf as opportunities arose.
Similar to his argument regarding the Hobbs Act, he contends that the
district court failed to properly instruct the jury that, to sustain a
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 666, the government must prove "a
specific intent element" on [the defendant's] part "that there be a
connection between [his] intent and a specific official act."
By its terms, the statute does not require the government to prove that
[the defendant] contemplated a specific act when he received the bribe;
the text says nothing of a quid pro quo requirement to sustain a
conviction, express or otherwise: while a "quid pro quo of money for a
specific . . . act is sufficient to violate the statute," it is "not necessary."
Rather, it is enough if a defendant "corruptly solicits" "anything of
value" with the "inten[t] to be influenced or rewarded in connection"
with some transaction involving property or services worth $5000 or
more.
The district court's jury instructions were not improper for failing to
include a requirement that the government prove a direct link from some
specific payment to a promise of some specific official act.156
156. Id. at 517-18, 520-21. In United States v. Turner, 684 F.3d 244 (1st Cir. 2012), the defendant,
a member of the Boston City Council, was charged with extortion. At trial, the government presented
evidence that the defendant was paid cash in exchange for assistance in obtaining a liquor license. Id. at
254. In addition, the government presented evidence that the defendant denied receiving any payment.
Id The defendant was convicted and he appealed.
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E. SECTION 666 FEDERAL PROGRAM INTEGRITY
Section 666 is intended to protect the financial integrity of state and local
programs receiving federal funds and makes it a federal offense for a state or local
official to demand or receive a payment "intending to be influenced."1 5 7 Courts
have typically identified the elements of the offense as follows: (1) the defendant
must be an employee or agent of a state or local government agency;5 (2) the
agency must receive in excess of $10,000 in federal funding in any one-year
period; (3) the employee or agent must demand or accept a benefit; and (4) the
benefit must be in connection with any "business" or "transaction" in excess of
$5,000.159
The term "bribery" or "kickback" is not used in the statute. The statute
requires that the benefit must be given with intent to influence or reward a
government agent "in connection with any business, transaction, or series of
transactions."1 6 0 Section 666 does not say "official act" but states "any business,
transaction, or series of transactions."16 1 Section 666 does not say "in return for,"
"because of," or "in exchange for." Rather, it says "in connection with." 162
Regardless, what makes providing a benefit to a public official a crime is the nexus
between the benefit and any official "business" or "transaction." In essence, a
reading of the statute in a way that does not define "intending to be influenced" as
requiring a link between the benefit and an official act, would disregard the core
legal element of the offense. Because the federal program statute is in pari materia
with the honest services and extortion statutes, Section 666 offenses are limited to
bribery and kickback schemes.163
On appeal, the defendant argued that the jury was not instructed that to sustain his conviction
the jury was required to find that the payment was made in exchange for an official act and that the
evidence was not sufficient to support the conviction. Id The First Circuit rejected both of the
defendant's contentions. The appellate court first held that the jury was instructed that to sustain an
extortion conviction the government was required to prove a link between the payment and the official
act - "at least an implicit, as opposed to an explicit, quid pro quo or reciprocity understanding is
necessary." The appellate court then found that the evidence was sufficient and rejected the defendant's
contention that the payment was merely a gift and not linked to any official act. Id. at 254-259.
157. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) (2012).
158. The defendant can either be the public official who solicits or accepts the bribe or the
individual who pays the bribe.
159. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) (2012); United States v. Fernandez, 722 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2013)
("Thus, the bribe can be 'anything of value' - it need not be worth $5000. The $5000 element instead
refers to the value of the 'business' or 'transaction' sought to be influenced by the bribe.").
160. 18 U.S.C. §§ 666(a)(1)(B), (a)(2).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. There are no other potential theories that could fall within the scope of the conduct precluded
by the statute. The failure to disclose a conflict of interest or providing a gratuity do not require a
corrupt payment and a nexus between a benefit and an official act and, therefore, would not fall within
the scope of the statute. In United States v. Fernandez, 722 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), the defendants, a
commonwealth Senator and a businessman, were charged with violating § 666. At trial, the government
introduced evidence that the Senator promoted legislation favorable to the defendant's business
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The courts, however, have not articulated such a clear evidentiary path to
conviction and have imposed a lower standard of proof on the government. Courts
have not required the government to prove a direct connection or identify the state
action or conduct of government at or near the time that the benefit is provided to
the public official; rather, to sustain a Section 666 conviction, the government must
prove only that the benefits were provided to the public official to influence some
official act. For example, the Eleventh Circuit has held that when the benefit does
not take the form of a campaign contribution, the government can sustain a
conviction by proving a connection between the benefit and some official act, as
opposed to a specific official act.1 6 4 In United States v. McNair, county officials of
Jefferson County, Alabama and contractors were charged with numerous public
corruption offenses related to a municipal sewer and wastewater repair and
rehabilitation project.1 65 At trial, the government presented evidence that the
county officials overseeing the project received kickbacks from the contractors in
exchange for construction and engineering contracts.1 66 On appeal, the defendants
argued that "intending to be influenced" requires a direct link between the benefit
and a specific official act.167 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendants'
assertion and held that the government was not required to prove a direct link
between the kickback and a specific official act.1 68 The court explained:
[W]e now expressly hold that there is no requirement in [Section 666]
that the government allege or prove an intent that a specific payment
was solicited, received, or given in exchange for a specific official act,
termed a quid pro quo.169
Importantly, § 666(a)(1)(B) and (a)(2) do not contain the Latin phrase
quid pro quo. Nor do those sections contain language such as "in
exchange for an official act" or "in return for an official act." In short,
nothing in the plain language of § 666(a)(1)(B) nor § 666(a)(2) requires
that a specific payment be solicited, received, or given in exchange for a
specific official act.
Simply put, the government is not required to tie or directly link a
benefit or payment to a specific official act by that County employee.
interests at the same time he received travel and entertainment expenses. The defendants were convicted
and they appealed. On appeal they argued that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that they could
find the defendants guilty of a § 666 offense for offering and receiving a gratuity rather than a bribe.
The First Circuit agreed and vacated the conviction. The court held that § 666 does not encompass
illegal gratuities. The court explained that the statute specifically require that the government prove a
corrupt payment. Therefore, to sustain a § 666 conviction, the government must prove a connection
between the payment and an official act. Id. at 23-24.
164. United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1188 (11th Cir. 2010).
165. Id at 1164-65.
166. Id at 1164, 1169.
167. Id. at 1184-85.
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The intent that must be proven is an intent to corruptly influence or to be
influenced "in connection with any business" or "transaction," not an
intent to engage in any specific quid pro quo.170
Nevertheless, the court did acknowledge, that the government was required to
prove some connection between the payment and official act.17 1 The court found
that "sizable benefits" were provided with the intent to influence the county
officials. 172 There was no evidence of gifts to the county officials before the
projects began, and the extent to which the defendants attempted to conceal the
benefits was "powerful evidence" of the corrupt payments.173
When the payment takes the form of a campaign contribution, the
Eleventh Circuit has extended McCormick to Section 666 prosecutions and defined
"intending to be influenced" to mean a direct connection between the payment and
a specific official act.174 In United States v. Siegelman, the former Governor of
Alabama was charged with various public corruption offenses based on accepting a
campaign contribution to an education lottery campaign in exchange for a political
170. Id. at 1187-88.
171. Id. at 1188-89.
172. Id at 1196.
173. Id. The court also rejected the defendant's assertion that that benefits were "gifts" not bribes.
See id at 1194-95. In United States v. Langford, 647 F.3d 1309, 1331-32 (11th Cir. 2011), the
defendant, a Commissioner for Jefferson County, Alabama, was charged with federal program bribery.
At trial, the government introduced evidence that while he was serving as a Commissioner, the
defendant accepted more than $240,000 in cash, clothing andjewelry from a local investment banker in
exchange for steering municipal contracts involving the underwriting and marketing of municipal bonds
to his firm. The defendant was convicted and he appealed. On appeal, the defendant asserted that a
specific quid pro quo was required and that the government failed to prove a link between the benefit
and a specific official act. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendant's contention and affirmed the
conviction. In United States v. Keen, 679 F.3d 981 (11th Cir. 2012), the defendants, county
commissioners for Dixie County, Florida, were charged with federal program bribery. At trial, the
government introduced evidence that the defendant was provided cash by an undercover FBI agent in
exchange for favorable decisions in connection with a fictitious development project. The defendants
were convicted and they appealed. On appeal, the defendants argued that the evidence was insufficient
to support their convictions. In particular, the defendants argued that the government failed to prove
"which particular business or transaction before the Dixie County Board of Commissioners was
connected to the bribes nor the value of the benefit to be attained through bribes." Id. at 994. The
Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendants arguments and affirmed the conviction. The court explained
that:
This Court has made it clear that § 666(a)(1)(B) does not require the government
to prove a specific official act for which a bribe was received. Rather, the
government must show only that [the defendants] "corruptly" accepted "anything
of value" with the intent "to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any
business, transaction, or series of transactions" of the Board. That is precisely
what the government did when it presented evidence that [the defendants]
accepted bribes from [undercover FBI agent] with the understanding that they
would facilitate the approval of zoning changes benefitting the fictitious
company of "Sean Michaels."
Id. (citations omitted).
174. United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1171-72 (11th Cir. 2011).
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appointment to the board that determined the number of healthcare facilities in the
state.17 5 At trial, the government introduced evidence that the campaign
contribution was provided in exchange for the specific appointment.1 76 On appeal,
the defendant argued that district court erred in not requiring the jury to find a
direct link between the campaign contribution and the specific appointment.1 7 7 The
court of appeals agreed that the McCormick standard applied to Section 666
prosecutions, and held that because the payment took the form of a campaign
contribution, to sustain these convictions, the government was required to prove
and the jury must find a direct link between the payment and a specific official
act.1 78 The court found, however, that the government had proven this direct nexus.
The court explained that:
The district court in this case instructed the jury that they could not
convict the defendants of bribery in this case unless "the defendant and
the official agree that the official will take specific action in exchange
for the thing of value." This instruction was fashioned by the court in
direct response to defendants' request for a quid pro quo instruction, and
was given in addition to the Eleventh Circuit's pattern jury instruction
for § 666 bribery cases. So, even if a quid pro quo instruction was
required, such an instruction was given.179
The defendants further argued that the district court erred in not requiring the
government to prove the link with direct, rather than circumstantial, evidence.180
The court of appeals disagreed and held that the government could rely on
circumstantial evidence even in cases where the government was required to prove
a direct nexus to a specific official act:
McCormick uses the word "explicit" when describing the sort of
agreement that is required to convict a defendant for extorting campaign
contributions. Explicit, however, does not mean express. Defendants
argue that only "proof of actual conversations by defendants," will do,
suggesting in their brief that only express words of promise overheard
by third parties or by means of electronic surveillance will do. But there
is no requirement that this agreement be memorialized in a writing, or
even, as defendants suggest, be overheard by a third party. Since the
agreement is for some specific action or inaction, the agreement must be
explicit, but there is no requirement that it be express.
175. Id. at 1163.
176. Id
177. Id at 1171.
178. Id at 1171-72.
179. Id at 1170-71.
180. Id. at 1171.
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In this case, the jury was instructed that they could not convict the
defendants of bribery unless they found that "the Defendant and official
agree[d] that the official will take specific action in exchange for the
thing of value." This instruction required the jury to find an agreement
to exchange a specific official action for a campaign contribution.
Finding this fact would satisfy McCormick's requirement for an explicit
agreement involving a quid pro quo. Therefore, even assuming a quid
pro quo instruction is required to convict the defendants under § 666,
we find no reversible error in the bribery instructions given by the
district court.
Finally, the defendant asserted that Skilling compelled the reversal of the honest
services conviction because the jury was not instructed that the government was
required to prove a quid pro quo in order to convict them on a bribery theory of
honest services fraud.1 8 2 The court, while declining to extend the McCormick
standard to honest services fraud, nevertheless held that because the evidence
sustaining the pay-to-play scheme was applicable to both the Section 666 charge
and honest services fraud, the jury was properly instructed that they could not
convict the defendant unless they found that the payment was linked to a specific
official act.18 3 The court correctly observed, however, that, "After Skilling, it may
well be that the honest services fraud statute, like the extortion statute in
McCormick, required a quid pro quo in a campaign donation case."18 4
In United States v. Beldini, the Third Circuit declined the opportunity to
find that Section 666 was limited to bribery and kickback schemes and that the
government was required to prove a direct link between the benefit and a specific
official act."' In Beldini, the defendant was the Deputy Mayor of Jersey City, New
Jersey, who reported directly to the Mayor.186 An FBI Confidential Informant
("CI"), posing as a real estate developer, offered to make campaign contributions
in return for the Mayor expediting approval for a fictitious real estate development
project.1 8 7 The defendant facilitated meetings with the Mayor and promised to
work to provide the CI relief from existing zoning regulations. Later, the CI
made a second $10,000 campaign contribution that was funneled to the Mayor's
campaign through third-party intermediaries.18 9 The defendant was convicted and
appealed.1 9 0 On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court failed to instruct
181. Id. at 1171-72.
182. Id. at 1173.
183. Id. at 1173-74.
184. Id. at 1173 n.21.
185. United States v. Beldini, 443 F. App'x 709, 710 (3d Cir. 2011).
186. Id
187. Id
188. Id. at 711-12.
189. Id
190. Id. at 710.
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the jury that, to sustain the conviction, the government was required to prove a link
between the payment and a specific act.19 1
The Third Circuit affirmed the conviction and rejected the defendant's
argument.1 9 2 Because the defendant failed to object to the district court's decision
not to give a quid pro quo instruction, the Third Circuit held that the plain error
standard applied.1 9 3 Because there was no binding precedent requiring the
government to prove a direct link between the benefit and an official act, any
"error" in failing to instruct the jury was not plain, clear, or obvious to require a
reversal under the plain error rule.19 4 The appellate court applied the lower
standard of proof and held that the government was only required to prove some
connection between the benefit and some official action.195
In United States v. McGregor, four Alabama state lawmakers, several
lobbyists, and gambling company executives were charged with federal program
integrity, extortion, and honest services fraud.196 At trial the government
introduced evidence that suggested that campaign contributions were offered in
return for official acts.197 After the defendants were acquitted, the district court
filed an opinion intended to provide guidance on the question of when a campaign
contribution may be considered a bribe.198
The district court first recognized that to sustain a conviction for each
offense, the government is required to prove a sufficient nexus between a
benefit to a public official and an official act.199 The trial court then explained
that when the benefit to the public official takes the form of a campaign
contribution, a heightened quid pro quo "standard" is warranted.200 As a result,
the district court gave the jury an instruction that required the government to
prove a direct link between the campaign contribution and specific official
act.
201
191. Id at 710, 714, 717.
192. Id. at 717, 721.
193. Id. at 713.
194. Id at 717.
195. Id
196. United States v. McGregor, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1310 (M.D. Ala. 2012).
197. Id. at 1311-12.
198. Id. at 1310.
199. Id. at 1314.
200. Id.
201. The district court's jury instruction stated that:
Campaign contributions and fundraising are an important, unavoidable and
legitimate part of the American system of privately financed elections. The law
recognizes that campaign contributions may be given to an elected public official
because the giver supports the acts done or to be done by the elected official. The
law thus also recognizes that legitimate, honest campaign contributions are given
to reward public officials with whom the donor agrees, and in the generalized
hope that the official will continue to take similar official actions in the future.
Therefore, the solicitation or acceptance by an elected official of a campaign
contribution does not, in itself, constitute a federal crime, even though the donor
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F. DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Imposing the higher standard of proof on the government should not
present an obstacle to conviction. In addition to identifying the state action or
conduct of government close in time to when the benefit is provided to the public
official, there are several ways that the prosecution can further support the
evidence of a corrupt intent. Once the benefit is traced to the public official, the
question remaining is whether there is a sufficient nexus between the benefit and
state action and conduct of government. To prove this link, the prosecutor will
examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the exchange, including: (1) the
value of the benefit; (2) the timing of the benefit;2 02 (3) the nature of the official
act; (4) the value of the official act to the source of the benefit; (5) the relationship
between the public official and source of the benefit; (6) any effort to conceal the
payment; (7) the use of third-party agents as conduits for the benefit; (8) the
falsification of any documents; (9) any effort to conceal the relationship between
the public official and source of the benefit; (10) any effort to destroy evidence;
and (11) the defendant's behavior before and after the corrupt scheme came under
scrutiny. The defense will attempt to undermine the government's assertion by
arguing that that the payment and official were not linked to any official act.20 3
has business pending before the official, and even if the contribution is made
shortly before or after the official acts favorably to the donor.
However, when there is a quid pro quo agreement, orally or in writing, that is, a
mutual understanding, between the donor and the elected official that a campaign
contribution is conditioned on the performance of a specific official action, it
constitutes a bribe under federal law. By this phrase, I mean that a generalized
expectation of some future favorable action is not sufficient for a quid pro quo
agreement; rather, the agreement must be one that the campaign contribution will
be given in exchange for the official agreeing to take or forgo some specific
action in order for the agreement to be criminal. A close-in-time relationship
between the donation and the act is not enough to establish an illegal agreement.
A promise of a campaign contribution or a solicitation o f a campaign
contribution may be an illegal quid pro quo, as well. But to be illegal (1) it must be a
promise or solicitation conditioned on the performance of a specific official
action as I explained that phrase in the preceding paragraph; (2) it must be explicit;
and (3) it must be material. To be explicit, the promise or solicitation need not be
in writing but must be clearly set forth. An explicit promise or solicitation can be
inferred from both direct and circumstantial evidence, including the
defendant's words, conduct, acts, and all the surrounding circumstances disclosed
by the evidence, as well as the rational or logical inferences that may be drawn
from them.
Id. at 1310-1311; 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012).
202. The receipt of a benefit for an official act that would have been taken regardless of the benefit
violates the federal public corruption statutes. See United States v. Derrick, 163 F.3d 799 (4th Cir.
1998).
203. See, e.g., United States v. White, 663 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 2011) (rejecting defendant's
argument that cash payments were not taken with corrupt intent to influence an official act); United
States v. Abbey, 560 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2009) (rejecting defendant's argument that there was no
agreement o take a specific act when property was transferred to defendant).
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Therefore, the facts and circumstance surrounding the payment and official act will
be critical in determining the legitimacy of the benefit provided.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is not a crime to provide a gift, loan, employment, or other financial
benefit to a public official or those close to him. What makes such a practice
corrupt and a federal criminal offense is when public officials abuse their position
for financial gain and use their government positions and discretion over state
action or the conduct of government as a lucrative financial opportunities for
themselves, their family, friends, or associates. As a consequence, each of the
federal public corruption statutes require that the government prove a sufficient
nexus or connection between a financial benefit provided to a public official2 0 4 and
an official act. It is this agreement or corrupt intent that makes the conduct a
federal criminal offense. Although the central legal element is this link between the
benefit to the public official and official act, the courts have failed to provide the
government with a path to conviction that is fundamentally fair to the defendant.
In McDonnell, the Supreme Court clearly expressed a concern about the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion and the need for a fundamentally fair
application of the law-that it should be applied as a "scalpel" rather than a "meat
axe."205 The courts have repeatedly used the term quid pro quo to describe the
critical element of a bribery or kickback offense and have required the government
prove a nexus between the benefit and official act. However, this term is used
regardless of the form of the benefit or inducement provided to the public official.
As a result, the term quid pro quo has been used to mean two different evidentiary
requirements: that a payment was made to a public official in exchange for some
official action, and that a payment was made in exchange for a specific official act.
This is a significant distinction because the burden of proving a direct connection
is significantly higher than proving some connection. The courts have imposed the
higher burden of proof only when the benefit takes the form of a campaign
204. Corrupt payments are typically tendered with the intent to induce the following official acts:
(1) provide government financial support for public and private projects; (2) favorable legislation or
regulatory scrutiny; or (3) awarding government contracts. The form of benefit provided to the public
official may include: (1) campaign contributions; (2) cash payments; (3) gifts of luxury items; (4)
consulting fees; (5) travel and entertainment expenses and/or; (6) insider information regarding
financial transactions. The scope of the benefits include benefits provided directly to the public official,
family members and/or close associates. The benefits provided to or on behalf of the public official
should be of some consequence. See e.g., United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014)
(holding that to sustain insider trading conviction the government must prove that the defendant
received a benefit of some consequence).
205. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2373; see also United States v. Weimert, 819 F.3d 351, 370 (7th Cir.
2016) (reversing wire fraud conviction based on deceptive statements about negotiation positions and
finding that the limits of the federal wire fraud statute must be "defined by more than just prosecutorial
discretion."); United States ex rel. O'Connell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 822 F.3d 650, 658 (2d
Cir. 2016) (reversing civil judgment and holding that breach of contract does not support fraud claim
absent evidence of fraudulent intent not to perform the promise at the time of contract execution).
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contribution. This is a distinction without merit. The criterion of guilt is the corrupt
intent-not the form of the benefit provided to the public official. The lower
evidentiary standard provides no comfort to justice. This lower standard is
ambiguous, inconsistent, and allows for doubt. Ambiguous and inconsistent
evidentiary standards rarely translate into meaningful jury verdicts or appellate
review. Therefore, courts should jettison this distinction and uniformly impose a
higher standard of proof To trigger the corruption statutes, the courts should
require the government to prove a corrupt intent-a direct connection between the
benefit and intent to influence or affect state action or the conduct of government.
Moreover, the courts should require the prosecution to identify this official act at
the time the benefit is provided to the public official. This will result in clarifying
the criterion of guilt and the fundamentally fair application of each of these federal
corruption statutes.
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